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Grossman and Helpman (1995, henceforth GH95) formally model a two-level game in the
context of trade protection between two countries. The framework of two-level games was
ﬁrst presented in Putnam (1988). Putnam’s idea is that the set over which bilateral ne-
gotiations between two governments takes place is determined ﬁrst by political-economic
interactions between each country’s government and its interest groups. Grossman and
Helpman elegantly model these strategic interactions as well as those between governments.
Their model is both about retaliation and conciliation. Retaliation is a Nash equilibrium in
tariﬀs between two countries, and conciliation is the equilibrium result of bargaining over
tariﬀs between the two governments. What is attractive about the model is that it predicts
the ensuing structure of cross-industry tariﬀs. Thus, the model may be tested directly with-
out recourse to ad hoc methods. This article conducts a theory based empirical test of trade
barriers as bargaining outcomes, or the structure of tariﬀs that theoretically emerges in the
Grossman-Helpman “trade talks” equilibrium.
A peek into the scores of pending trade dispute cases, any of which has the potential to
boil over into a full blown trade war, is evidence enough of the relevance of the Grossman-
Helpman model. It provides insight into why such disputes might occur and how they may
be resolved. Whether this insight is the relevant one for understanding the structure of
bilateral trade barriers is the subject of this article.
The GH95 model is built upon the foundations of their political economy model of equilib-
rium unilateral tariﬀs (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . The model consists of a government
that is amenable to lobbying by ﬁrms but it is also concerned about welfare losses from
distortionary policy. Persons who possess speciﬁc capital stand to gain rents from protec-
tion. They thus have an incentive to form into lobbies with the purpose of inﬂuencing policy
in a manner that beneﬁts them. The model delivers prediction about the cross-sectional
structure of tariﬀ protection in which the level of tariﬀ protection to a politically organized
industry (that makes lobbying contributions) depends on the output-to-import ratio, the
price elasticity of import demand, and the weight that government places on a dollar of lob-
1bying spending versus a dollar of welfare loss from protection. Industry output captures the
size of rents from protection; imports determine the extent of welfare losses from protection,
so the smaller the imports the higher the tariﬀ; akin to Ramsey pricing the lower the ab-
solute import demand elasticity, the higher the tariﬀ. This prediction has been empirically
examined in a series of recent studies, including Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasolglu (2002), McCalman (2002), and
Eicher and Osang (2003).
GH95 models the strategic interactions between two large open economies, each with a
political economic structure similar to that of the unilateral model. Since they are large
countries, they possess market power in sets of industries, which induces governments to
impose optimal tariﬀso ne a c ho t h e r .T h eﬁrst such optimal tariﬀ argument was formulated
in Johnson (1953) and extended by numerous authors (see Gawande and Hansen, 1999,
for references to more works and for empirical evidence of retaliation models). The novel
contribution of GH95 is their prediction of equilibrium tariﬀsw h e nt h eg o v e r n m e n t so f
these two large countries negotiate with each other. In the article we show how the GH95
prediction is linked with their unilateral result. We then proceed to test the model using
bilateral trade barrier data from the 1990sb e t w e e nt h eU Sa n dJ a p a na n dt h eU Sa n dt h e
EU.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II intuitively describes the GH95 model. Section
III is the main empirical part of the article. The estimating equations are derived, the data
described in detail, and the results presented and discussed. Section IV concludes.
II. Theory
We begin with Putnam’s (1988) widely cited framework of two-level games to intuitively
understand the GH95 model. At Level II, constituents in the two countries negotiate among
each other and at Level I their governments negotiate an agreement. In its general form,
Level II ratiﬁcation in each country takes the form of competition among opposing lobbies
2(as in GH94), or between domestic and foreign lobbies, or between protectionist producer
and antiprotectionist consumer interests, with each interest group making contributions to
the governments or expressing displeasure by withholding votes. Figure 1 intuitively depicts
the framework in the context of the GH95 model in which Home’s and Foreign’s tariﬀsa n d
export subsidies are determined jointly in industry i. In this bilateral model, the importing
country, say Home, chooses to impose a tariﬀ th
i and Foreign chooses an export subsidy
t
f




Home’s government is indiﬀerent. These ICs arise from a political welfare function that is a
weighted sum of the welfare of Home’s citizens and money contributions by Home’s special
interest groups. The value of the home government’s political welfare increases as we move
towards the top left of Figure 1. The Level II interactions between a government and its
polity constrain the government to do better than the bold indiﬀerence curve labeled H0.
Similarly, the foreign government’s political welfare increases as we move to the bottom
right. The bold IC labeled F0 is the lowest level of utility it will tolerate. The elliptical area
enclosed by H0 and F0 is the set over which strategic Level I interactions between the two
countries occurs. If Foreign is the stronger bargainer, it will be able to force an outcome
close to the point where its IC is tangential to Home’s lowest acceptable IC, H0. If Home is
the stronger bargainer it will be able to force an outcome close to the point F0 where its IC
is tangential to Foreign’s lowest acceptable IC.1
The GH95 model is a speciﬁc application of this general framework. The political welfare of





where W h is welfare of the home country residents, and Ch is the total amount of money
that lobbies in the home country contribute to the government. The parameter ah is the
1In a trade war the outcome may actually be worse than the lowest possible IC a government is willing to
tolerate based on it’s unilateral stance. If the rival government has market power, it will impose an optimal
tariﬀ that makes it better oﬀ by ”beggaring its neighbor”.
3weight placed by the home government on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar of campaign





where the parameter af is the weight placed by the foreign government and the welfare of
its residents Wf relative to the money contributions it receives from lobbyists that reside
there.2
First, consider how political economic interactions within a country condition its govern-
ment’s choices. The production and consumption sides of the model are simple. n goods are
produced with constant returns to scale technology. Each good uses labor and a (diﬀerent)
speciﬁc input. A numeraire good that is produced with labor alone ﬁxes wage. The speciﬁc
input is in limited supply, and hence com m a n d sr e n t s .R e n t st oo w n e r so fas p e c i ﬁc input
increase with the price of the good which uses that input. Thus owners of that speciﬁc
input have a strong incentive to inﬂuence government policy in a manner that raises the
good’s price. Knowing the government’s attraction for contributions, these owners overcome
the free-rider problem and organize into lobbies to make their demands most eﬀectively
communicated to their government.
Government uses trade policy, consisting of tariﬀs for import competing producers and export
subsidies for exporters, in order to increase the domestic price of the good. In the absence of
any reactions by the trading partner, a country’s government will set prices unilaterally for
each of the n goods via trade policy. Hence, policy is represented by the n-vector of prices
p. Lobbies representing each good move ﬁrst. Each lobby presents the government with
a menu of contribution oﬀers in which it matches every possible vector p with its stated
money contribution. This is a binding contract, and once the government sets a policy the
lobby willingly pays what it said it would. To keep things simple, we will presume that a
negligible proportion of the population is organized so that each lobby is concerned with
2We presume foreigners are precluded form lobbying in the home country and vice versa.
4only the rents from protection to their own good and not the loss in welfare they experience
from paying higher prices on other goods that are protected or subsidized.3
The government moves next. Based on all the menu oﬀers it receives, the home government
sets tariﬀs and subsidies in order to maximize (1) (or (2) if it is the foreign government),
and collects the contributions that were promised. In this unilateral set-up Grossman and
Helpman (1994) show that the equilibrium tariﬀs and subsidies will be set by the home
















,i =1 ,...,n. (3)
In (3) ti =( ph
i − πi)/πi is the ad valorem tariﬀ (positive) or export subsidy (also positive)
for good i,w h e r eph
i is the domestic price for good i in Home and πi its world price. In
the ﬁrst term on the right hand side Ih
i is an indicator variable that equals one if sector i is
organized into a lobby, and ah > 0i sa sd e ﬁned in (1). zh
i = Xh
i /M h
i is the equilibrium ratio
of output to imports (exports if Mh
i is negative) and eh
i = −Mh 
i · ph
i /M h
i is the elasticity of
import demand (positive) or export supply (negative). If industry i is an import-competing
producer and it is organized (Ii > 0) then it is able to ”buy” protection (th
i > 0). If industry
i is an exporter and is organized, it is able to ”buy” an export subsidy (th
i > 0). Hence,
industry i is protected or subsidized only if it is organized, but not otherwise.
Equation (3) summarizes the result of Level II interactions within the Home country. In-
dustry output captures the size of rents from protection. Imports (exports) determine the
extent of welfare losses from protection (subsidies), so the smaller the imports (exports) the
higher the tariﬀ (subsidy). The Ramsey pricing logic is inherent in (3) so that the lower
the absolute import demand elasticity, the higher the tariﬀ or subsidy. The cross-sectional
structure predicted by GH94 is empirically examined in a series of recent studies, including
Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Mitra, Thomakos and
3GH94 and GH95 model the menu of oﬀers as a Nash equilibrium among competing lobbies.
5Ulubasolglu (2002), McCalman (2002), and Eicher and Osang (2003).
The possibility of strategic Level I interactions via trade talks between the two governments
alter the unilateral structure of protection and subsidies. GH95 consider a bargaining equi-
librium in tariﬀs and subsidies in bilateral negotiations between Home and Foreign. With
Level I bargaining, Home and Foreign tariﬀs and subsidies are determined together according
to the following equation (same as GH95 eq. 24). Let τi =1+ti where ti is the ad valorem































where πi is the world price of good i. If Home is the importer of good i and Foreign is the
exporter then τh
i =1+th
i ,w h e r eti > 0 is the ad valorem tariﬀ and the domestic price of
good i in Home is ph
i = πiτh













of good i in Home and Foreign, respectively. Mh
i > 0i sH o m e ’ si m p o r td e m a n df u n c t i o n
(as a function of Home’s domestic price ph
i ) for good i. M
f
i < 0 is Foreign’s export supply
function (as a function of Foreign’s domestic price p
f
i ) for good i. Market clearing requires
prices such that Mh
i +M
f
i = 0. Note that with market power Home’s tariﬀ and/or Foreign’s
export subsidy depresses the world price πi (see e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld 2003).
III. Empirics: Methodology, Data, and Results
III.1 Methodology
From (4) we derive an estimating equation. In order to be explicit, we will follow these
4This equation presumes that the fraction of the population organized politically is negligible. When a
signiﬁcant proportion of population α is organized, the GH95 model makes predicts that home and foreign


































6conventions. In the importing country zi = Xi/Mi is the equilibrium ratio of domestic
output (Xi > 0) to imports (Mi > 0) and the import demand elasticity edi = M 
ipi/Mi.
Note that zi > 0 for the importing industry, and edi < 0 for the importing industry. Thus
zi/ei < 0 in the importing industry. We will express our formula in terms of zi/|edi| > 0
in the importing industry. In the exporting country zi = Xi/Mi is the equilibrium ratio of
domestic output (Xi) to exports (Mi < 0) and the export supply elasticity esi = M 
ipi/Mi.
zi = Xi/Mi < 0a n desi > 0 for the exporting industry. We will express our formula in terms
of |zi| = Xi/|Mi| > 0, so |zi|/esi > 0. Then manipulations to (2) (see appendix) lead to the



































































+  i if Foreign is the importer in i. (6)
Note that in (5), with Home as the importer of good i and Foreign the exporter, τh
i =1 +
Home’s ad valorem tariﬀ on good i and τ
f
i = 1+ Foreign’s ad valorem export subsidy
on good i. In (6), with Foreign as the importer of good i and Home the exporter, then
τ
f
i = 1+ Foreign’s ad valorem tariﬀ on good i and τh
i =1 +H o m e ’ sa dv a l o r e me x p o r t
subsidy on good i.T h ec o e ﬃcients βh =1 /ah,a n dβf =1 /af. The error term  i contains
higher order Taylor series term, since (5) and (6) are derived as a ﬁrst order Taylor series
from the nonlinear model. It is presumed to be identically and independently normally
distributed with homoscedastic variance σ2. Estimating the coeﬃcients econometrically
(using a stochastic version of this model) thus allows us to recover the key political economy
parameters ah and af. The following linear model (with iid normal error term ui with





























































+ ui if Foreign is the importer in i. (8)
III.2 Data
Dependent Variable
The empirical analysis is at the 6-digit NAICS level. In place of the ad valorem rate, we
use the nontariﬀ barrier (NTB) coverage ratio (or the proportion of imports from a source
country that are covered by an NTB) for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that tariﬀs are determined
multilaterally since the Kennedy rounds, and using tariﬀ data in a model that is essentially
bilateral is less meaningful. The second reason is that nontariﬀ barriers have steadily in-
creased at the same time that tariﬀs have declined, and most NTBs are set bilaterally. The
source of the NTB data are the UNCTAD TRAINS database. This database indicates bi-
lateral NTBs at the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) level of over 6000 commodities. The
database identiﬁes seven types of NTBs that are described in Table 1. Using bilateral US-
Japan and US-EU imports,5 we construct coverage ratios of each of the seven types of NTBs
at the 6-digit NAICS level for each country-pair.6 Thus we obtain US NTB coverage of
imports from Japan (for each of the seven NTB types), Japan’s NTB coverage of imports
from the US, US NTB coverage of imports from the EU, and the EU’s NTB coverage of
imports from the US. These coverage ratios are used in place of ti for the importing country
so that τi = 1+ NTB coverage ratio on imports from the partner country. The US-Japan
NTB data are constructed for each of the ﬁve years between 1994-98. The US-EU data are
5EU consists of 15 member countries in 1995. They are Austria, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom.
6The U.S. Census Bureau concordance available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/reference/codes/index.html#concordance was applied to aggregate the bilateral US-Japan and
US-EU HS level NTB indicators down to the 6-digit NAICS lines using the relevant bilateral imports as
weights.
8available only for 1994.
Export subsidy data are unfortunately unavailable at the scope of this study.7 The absence
of export subsidy data implies that in the empirical analysis we must presume ti =0f o rt h e
exporting country so that τi =1 .
Foreign and Domestic Political Organization
We presume that all industries are politically organized (see e.g. the Federal Election Com-
mission website at www.fec.org and also www.opensecrets.org). It is well known that all
manufacturing industries in the US are represented by political action committees (PACs)
that make campaign contributions support the election campaigns of Presidential and con-
gressional candidates. The issue of whether these industries make trade policy-related con-
tributions is debatable, but the fact of their being politically organized indicates that they
have resolved the free rider problem, and sunk in the ﬁxed costs related to forming lobbies.
We imagine that these lobbies are positioned to make contributions to represent their view
on trade policy issues. It is also well known that some industries (e.g. apparel, textiles, and
leather good production) contribute less and have less political clout than other industries,
and this issue can only be resolved by collecting campaign contributions data across all in-
dustries. This task is not undertaken in this article and is left open as an issue for future
research.
Our research into political organization of manufacturing industries in Japan and the EU
indicates that in these advanced countries lobbies represent ﬁrms across the spectrum of in-
dustries. Japanese industrial sectors are formed into diﬀerent organizations and associations
to eﬀectively lobby policy-makers (Nelson 1988). Lobbying activities include developing new
product, preparing submissions to government, performing research studies, attending testi-
mony, meeting with Members of Parliament; contacting politician and bureaucrats; holding
news conferences and interviews, and etc. Donations from business and other organizations
were 13.5 billion yen in 1998 (economics.com). In the EU most industrial organizations and
7In agriculture, the agreement among countries to “tariﬀy” their subsidies has export subsidies transpar-
ent, but not so in manufacturing.
9associations are allied across member countries. They make their inﬂu e n c ef e l ta tt h el e v e l s
of national governments as well as at the EU policymaking levels of the European Com-
mission and the European Parliament. Their lobbying activities are primarily informational
through access and contacts. EU has accredited 4,179 lobbyists representing diﬀerent sectors
and groups.8
zi and ei
To construct zi = Xi/Mi we use output and bilateral trade data from the World Bank Trade
and Production database constructed by Nicita and Olarrega (Nicita and Olarrega, 2001).
The data are available at 4-digit ISIC (rev. 2) levels for US, Japan and EU. The concordance
from ISIC (rev. 2) to NAICS is done in two stages. First, the data are converted from ISIC
(rev. 2) to ISIC (rev. 3), and next from ISIC (rev. 3) to 6-digit NAICS.9 Since the ISIC to
NAICS mapping is one-to-many, when one ISIC industry maps into multiple (say, n)N A I C S
codes, the trade data for each NAICS industry is set equal to 1/n of the corresponding ISIC
data. The adding up condition is thus preserved.
The output data are also taken from Trade and Production database at 3-digit ISIC (rev.
2). Value added is used as the deﬁnition of output. The conversion is done in the same way
as for bilateral trade. The advantage of using the same database for output and imports
is that they are concorded uniformly from ISIC to NAICS. As a result the variable zi are
consistently calculated.
Import demand elasticities are taken from Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003). 309 short-
run elasticity estimates at 4-digit SIC (1987 basis) level are concorded into the 6-digit NAICS
(1997 basis) level as follows. First, we use an SIC-to-HS concordance10 to map the elasticity
data at the HS 10-digit level. Using the import values at the 10-digit HS level, the elasticities
are then aggregated down to the NAICS level (from a HS-NAICS concordance) using US
8EU Parliament website at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/lobby/lobby.jsp?lng=en&sort=byorg&index=ALL.
9Both concordance ﬁles are available at the website of UN Statistics Division:
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1.
10This was downloaded from http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/usixd/wp5515d.html. The ﬁle
was made available to this site by Rob Feenstra.
10imports as weights. Export supply elasticities have not been estimated at the scope of this
study. All export supply elasticities are thus set equal to 1. Thus, while the variables τi and
zi/ei are well measured for protection and imports, the unavailability of export subsidies
and export supply elasticities require simplifying assumptions about their values in order to
proceed with the estimation.
Other Variables
Four industry-group dummies are used as control variables. While US census of manufactur-
ing data may be used to construct other control variables, there is lack of such data for EU
and Japan. In order to treat them symmetrically, use of the dummies is a good compromise.
The four dummies are for Food processing industries, Resource Intensive industries, Capital
Intensive industries and General Manufacturing.11
III.3 Results
Table 1 describes the seven types non tariﬀ barriers from the TRAINS database used in this
study. Descriptive statistics for bilateral US-Japan and US-EU NTBs are also presented.
For example, in 1994 the mean coverage ratio of Product Characteristic Requirements was
0.152 for the US and almost zero for the EU. In other words roughly 15.2% (an import-
weighted average would be exact) of US imports in the sample from the EU were covered
by Tariﬀ Quotas, while the EU did not use this type of NTB to protect against US goods.
On the other hand, the US did not use Antidumping Duties on imports of manufacturing
from the EU but the EU did impose Antidumping Duties on the US, though in only a few
sectors. Licensing Authorization was a frequently used NTB on both sides. 12% of the
sample contained incidence of this type of NTB by the US and in 13% of the sample the EU







11imposed this NTB on US imports. Ostensibly less prohibitive, but with the potential to be
quite restrictive, are quality-assurance type of NTBs, which were used quite frequently by the
US. Thus, nearly 25% of the sample was covered by Product Characteristics Requirements,
17% by Product Labeling Requirements and 10% Product Inspections Requirements. The
EU did not impose these types of NTBs on the US. In sum, the EU primarily used Licensing
Authorization against the US but the US used quite a few diﬀerent types of NTBs on EU
imports.
Against Japan the US similarly used a variety of NTBs, but the most frequently used were
the quality-assurance NTBs. On the Japanese side, the main NTB used was Product Char-
acteristic Requirement. It is well known that such NTBs can be quite restrictive on the
Japanese side. Anecdotal incidents abound about authorities not allowing ships on port to
u n l o a dt h e i rc a r g of o rd a y sa tat i m eb e c a u s et hey have not met Japanese product charac-
teristic requirements.
Why countries use diﬀerent instruments is somewhat of a puzzle in the trade policy literature.
Very little work has been done on the issue of policy choice. Does a government’s ability to
negotiate during strategic interactions with other governments condition its choice of instru-
ments of protection? Or does its ability to choose from a set of instruments (perhaps based
on domestic Level II considerations) condition a government’s negotiating ability during its
strategic interactions with another country’s government. The stylized facts presented above
motivate further study into the issue of strategic interaction and policy substitutability.
Even though the model is about one way trade we must deal with the fact that in the data
there is considerable intraindustry trade. Thus, net imports in each industry were used to
deﬁne whether a country is a importer (and imposes NTBs) or the country is an exporter
(and uses exports subsidies). The pair of equations (5) and (6) are used to explore whether
the ratio of one country’s protection of industry i to the partner country’s export subsidy
can be well explained by the output-to-bilateral-gross-import ratio (scaled by the import
demand elasticity) and the output-to-bilateral-gross-export ratio (scaled by the export supply
elasticity) of the two countries. Estimates from this log-linear model using US Japan NTB
12data are reported in Table 2.1. The US-Japan sample pools industries over 1994-98. The
estimates indicate that a fairly sparse model with four dummy variables and the two focus
regressors is capable of explaining the variance in the relative NTB ratios quite well. For
example, the model for Tariﬀ Quotas has an R2 of 0 .229, and the model for Product
Inspection Requirement has an R2 of 0.406. However, the ﬁt varies quite a bit across diﬀerent
types of NTBs.
The US-Japan data allow clear and precise inferences about the coeﬃcients βh and βf.I n
the models of Tariﬀ Quotas, Antidumping Duties, Product Characteristics Requirements,
Product Labeling Requirements and Product Inspection Requirements both coeﬃcients are
estimated precisely with the expected positive signs. Thus, for these NTB types the estimates
allow us to recover the implied values of the underlying political economy parameters ah and
af. However, the same puzzle that was found in the earlier tests of the unilateral Grossman-
Helpman model is also found here, namely that the implied values of ah and af are extremely
high (this puzzle is examined in the survey article by Gawande and Krishna, 2003). They
indicate that both the US and the Japanese governments are overwhelmingly concerned with
welfare and pay negligible attention to lobbying contributions. But, as in the earlier studies,
this ﬁnding is not consistent with the fairly signiﬁcantly high level of NTBs these countries
impose on each other’s exports. The deadweight loss from protection in manufacturing has
historically been quite high (de Melo and Tarr 1990, and Hufbauer et. al 1986 estimate it in
the billions of dollars in the US). The implied estimates of ah and af thus grossly understate
both governments’ valuation of campaign contributions relative to welfare. A relatively small
amount of campaign contributions are used to purchase NTB protection, and the resulting
deadweight losses are many times the dollar value of those campaign contributions.
The US-EU data are only available for the 1993, resulting in an eﬀective sample of 295
NAICS industries. We note that in estimating the models from US-Japan and US-EU data
we have omitted outlying values of the regressors. Whenever |zi/ei| > 100 for either Home
or Foreign, that observation is dropped. This prevents a mere handful of observations from
imposing undue inﬂuence on the regression coeﬃcients. Some observations have exceedingly
13large values of the output-to-import ratio simply because their imports are negligible. Those
observations, and observations with zero bilateral trade are dropped. A signiﬁcant proportion
of industries is nonetheless represented in the sample. Nearly 60% of US, EU and Japanese
value added in manufacturing is captured by the sample.
The US-EU results validate the GH95 model for fewer NTB types than did the US-Japan
data. Only Tariﬀ Quota, Product Characteristic Requirements and Product Inspection
Requirements yield statistically signiﬁcant estimates for at least one of the β coeﬃcients.
F o rm o s tN T B st h e s ec o e ﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and
therefore do not allow us to recover the underlying ah and af parameters. The estimates
that are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, still yield very high implied values of ah and
af. The puzzle thus remains.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 contain estimates from the linear model in (7) and (8). The results are
qualitatively very similar to the Table 2 counterparts, indicating that the results are robust
to the two speciﬁcations. The quantitative estimates imply high values for the ah and af
parameters. For example, the ah estimates ranges from 345 to 5,982 for the US and from
333 to 3,698 for Japan. So, while the results qualitatively aﬃrm the GH model with US-
J a p a nd a t ai nt h es e n s et h a tb o t hc o e ﬃcients are estimated with the expected signs for
most NTB types, the estimate imply that both governments are welfare maximizing. As
mentioned before, and described in Gawande and Krishna (2003), this ﬁnding is at odds
with the evidence about deadweight losses from the NTBs imposed by the two countries.12
12Two types of robustness exercises were performed. First, the reported results deﬁne zi as the output-
to-gross-imports (and exports) ratio. We re-estimated the model with net imports in place of gross import.
The results are generally conﬁrmed the results reported earlier. Second, we estimated a related but diﬀerent
speciﬁcation. Since imports of one country equal to the exports of the partner country, we can multiply both




























































+  2i if Foreign is the importer in i. (10)
The error term  2i is heteroskedastic with variance M2
i σ2. We estimated the model with weighted least
squares. Again the estimates generally conform to the ones reported in Tables 2 and 3. Thus, the reported
14IV. Conclusion
This article presents theory-based empirical work on the determinants of bilateral nontariﬀ
barriers, using the Grossman-Helpman (1995) model to develop an econometric model. The
GH95 model is qualitatively validated by US-EU and US-Japan nontariﬀ barrier data (NTB).
The model imparts a key role to institutions. Given a set of institutions, here lobbies and a
government that cares about welfare as well as contributions from lobbies, the model derives
a prediction about equilibrium trade barriers. It is a positive theory, and oﬀers a deeper
explanation than seen in the literature for why we continue to see a proliferation of trade
barriers, despite multilaterally agreed reductions in tariﬀs.
In concluding we indicate directions in which the study can be improved and extended. The
ﬁrst is to construct export subsidy data at the industry level so that the empirics are more
“complete” than in this article. The second is to account for the possible endogeneity of
the regressors. For example, imports will be aﬀected by protection, and hence imports are
endogenous. Output is endogenous as well. In this article we do not undertake to correct
for the endogeneity since our objective is to show how the GH95 model may be tested, and
carry out preliminary tests. Constructing symmetric sets of instruments across partners
is a challenging task but one that should be undertaken before the results may be taken
as validating the model. Finally, the results ra i s et h es a m ep u z z l ea sp r e v i o u ss t u d i e so f
the unilateral GH model did, namely, that estimates of the weight given to welfare are
exceedingly high and do not appear to be consistent with the high welfare losses created by
NTBs, but only a fraction of which is compensated via campaign contributions. Rigorous
solutions to this puzzle would be a welcome contribution.
results are robust to a number of variations in speciﬁcation.
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I. Derivation of (3):















































Q if Foreign is the importer in industry i. (12)












































































if Foreign is the importer in i.
(14)
This is a nonlinear in the parameters βf and βh. In order to obtain a linear-in-parameter





I.  Data Availability 
 
Country NTB  Bilateral 
Trade 
Output Elasticity  Political 
Organization 
US  1994-98  1994-98 1994-98 1989--95  Current 
JP  1994-98  1994-98 1994-98   Current 
EU 1994  1993  1993    Current 
 
 
II.  Data  
 
1.  NTBs 
The NTB coverage ratio is derived from the database of United Nations’ Trade Analysis and 
Information System (TRAINS 2000, version 7.0).  This comprehensive database provides 
detailed information about the incidence of eight types of non-tariff measures (see Table 1) at the 
8-digit HS level, as well as bilateral imports (6-digit HS) from 1994-98.  The U.S. Census Bureau 
concordance (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/codes/index.html#concordance) was 
applied to aggregate the bilateral US-Japan and US-EU HS level NTB indicators down to the 6-
digit NAICS lines using the relevant bilateral imports as weights.  In sum, the NTB coverage ratio 









j ij i M C M r
1 1
) * ( , where C is the NTB indicator, and M is bilateral imports. 
 
2. Bilateral Trade 
The bilateral import and export data is from the World Bank Trade and Production database 
constructed by Nicita and Olarrega (Nicita and Olarrega, 2001). The data is available at 4-digit 
ISIC Rev2 levels for US, JP and EU.  The concordance from ISIC Rev2 to NAICS is done in two 
stages.  First, we convert ISIC Rev2 to ISIC Rev3.1, and second, we convert from ISIC Rev3.1 to 
NAICS (2002).  Both concordance files are available at the website of UN Statistics Division 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1). An issue is that the ISIC Rev3.1 to 
NAICS mapping is one-to-many.  When one ISIC industry maps into multiple (say, n) NAICS 
codes, the trade data for each NAICS industry is 1/n of the ISIC data.  
 
3. Output  
The output dataset is also constructed from Trade and Production database at 3-digit ISIC Rev2.  
We use value added as the index of output for US, JP and EU.  The conversion is derived in the 
same way the same as bilateral trade.  The advantage of this is that output and imports are 
concorded uniformly from ISIC to NAICS.  As a result the output-to-import ratios, which figure 
prominently in the regressors, are consistently calculated. 
 
4. Elasticity 
Import demand elasticities are taken from Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003).  309 short-run 
elasticity estimates at 4-digit SIC (1987 basis) level are concorded into the  4-digit NAICS (1997 
basis) level as follows. First, we use an SIC-to-HS concordance (downloaded from 
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/usixd/wp5515d.html and made available by Rob 
Feenstra) to map the elasticity data at the HS 10-digit level.  Using the import values at the 10-digit HS level, the elasticities are then aggregated down to the NAICS level (from a HS-NAICS 
concordance) using US imports as weights. 
5. European Union (EU) 
EU consists of 15 member countries as the European Union status in 1995.  They are Austria, 
Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
The NTBs are constructed using the full 15 country data, while the bilateral trade and output data 
includes 13 member countries except Belgium and Luxembourg.  
 
 
6. Political Organizations 
The following two tables provide the information on the Japan and EU’s manufacturing 
organizations and associations. 
 
 
Table B-1: Political Organizations in Japan 
3-digit NAICS Sectors  Organizations  Source  Indicator 
Dummy 
31
1 Food  Manufacturing  1 
31
2 
Beverage and Tobacco 
Product Manufacturing 
Brewers Association of Japan; Japan Dairy 
Industry Association; Japan Meat Processors 
Association; Japan Oilseed Processors 
Association; Japan Sake Brewers Association; 
The Brewing Society of Japan; The Japan Soft 






3  Textile Mills  0 
31
4  Textile Product Mills  0 
31
5 Apparel  Manufacturing 
Japan Apparel Industry Council, JAIC;  
Japan Chemical Fibers Association, JCFA;  
Japan Linen, Ramie & Jute Spinners' Association 
; 
Japan Silk Association Inc., JSA;  






Leather and Allied 
Product Manufacturing 











Japan Wood Research Society - Japan, 






2 Paper  Manufacturing 







Printing and Related 
Support Activities 
The Japan Federation of Printing Industries (JFPI)  http://www.jfpi.or.jp/en
glish/index.htm  1 
32 Petroleum and Coal  The Petroleum Energy Center (PEC)   http://www.pecj.or.jp/e 1 4 Products  Manufacturing  nglish/framebase-e.htm 
32
5 Chemical  Manufacturing 




Plastics and Rubber 
Products Manufacturing 
The Japan Plastics Industry Federation, JPIF; 
The Society of Rubber Industry, Japan, SRIJ 
http://www.jpif.gr.jp/en
glish/profile/m_list.htm





Japan Fine Ceramics Center (JFCC)  http://www.jfcc.or.jp/en





The Japan Institute of Metals (JIM), The 
Materials Process Technology Center(SOKEIZAI 








Fabricated Metal Product 
Manufacturing 
The Kozai Club / Japan Iron & Steel Exporters' 
Association,Metal Mining Agency of Japan 







3 Machinery  Manufacturing 
The Japan Machinery Federation, JMF ; 




http://www.jsim.or.jp  1 
33
4 
Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing 
















Bicycle Association(Japan)  
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association 
Inc., JAMA  
Japan Railway Contractors' Association, Inc.  
Nihon Bus Association, NBA  
The Japan Road Contractors Association, JRCA  






Furniture and Related 
Product Manufacturing 
the International Development Association of the 
Furniture Industry of Japan (IDAFIJ); Federation 










Japan Clock & Watch Association (JCWA)  http://www.wtctokyo.or
.jp/english/link/link.ht
ml  1 
Note: If the industry is directly manufacturing then indicator dummy variable =1, else=0.  Table B-2.  Political Organizations in EU 
3-digit NAICS 
Classification 









CIAA - Confederation of the Food and 









European Down and Feather 
Association - EDFA  


























C.E.I. BOIS – the European 


















European Confederation of Paint, 
Printing Ink and Artists' Colours 
Manufacturers Associations  
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/stdsd
evelopment/liaisonorglist/Liai





E&P Forum  Oil Industry International 
Exploration and Production Forum, 
















Association of Plastics Manufacturers 







European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers' 
Federation; 








European Association of Manufacturers 
of Quality Metal Expansion Joints, 













CECIMO, Orgalime  www.cecimo.be; 






































European Control Manufacturers 




Note: If the industry is directly manufacturing then indicator dummy variable =1, else=0. 
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18Figure 1:  Putnam’s bargaining set in a two-level game with political indifference curves.Table 1:  NTB Descriptions and Basic Statistics for Bilateral US-Japan and US-EU NTBs 
   US NTBs on EU imports  EU NTBs on US imports 
Variable  Description  N mean  s.d %  >  0  N mean s.d  %  >  0 
Tariff Quota  Tariff quota duties, rates are applied to a quota of 
imports under a given tariff heading.  295 0.012  0.101  2.7% 295  0.000 0.000 0.0% 
Antidumping 
Duties 
Antidumping measures, which may take the form 
of antidumping duties, price of undertakings or 
antidumping investigations. 
295  0 0 0%  295  0.008 0.051 3.7% 
Quotas & 
Prohibition 
Quotas and prohibition measures.  Quotas 
measures include global, bilateral, seasonal 
quotas; prohibition measures include seasonal 
prohibition, temporary prohibition and etc. 
295  0.006 0.052 2.0%  295  0.004 0.033 3.4% 
Licensing 
Authorization 
Automatic licensing and authorization measures, 
including authorization for wildlife protection, 
political reason, national security, and etc.  
295  0.051 0.192 13.2% 295  0.044 0.169 13.6% 
Product 
Characteristic  Product characteristics requirements  295  0.152 0.323 26.1% 295  0.006 0.060 2.7% 
Product 
Labeling  Product labeling requirement  295  0.067 0.224 16.3% 295  0.005 0.052 2.4% 
Product 
Inspection  Product inspection requirement  295  0.078 0.250 13.2% 295  6.1×10
−6 1.0×10
−4  0.4% 
   US NTBs on Japan imports  Japan NTBs on US imports 
    N Mean  s.d %  >  0  N mean s.d  %  >  0 
Tariff  Quota  See  above  1245 0.017 0.115 3.0%  1245 0.017  0.105  4.7% 
Antidumping 
Duties  ”  1245 0.070 0.186 25.7% 1245 0  0  0% 
Quotas & 
Prohibition  ”  1245 0.008 0.063 2.6%  1245 0.044  0.179  10.1% 
Licensing 
Authorization  ”  1245 0.039 0.174 11.3% 1245 0.027  0.128  9.8% 
Product 
Characteristic  ”  1245 0.155 0.329 26.4% 1245 0.192  0.361  34.9% 
Product 
Labeling  ”  1245 0.043 0.185 13.0% 1245 0.013  0.091  4.1% 
Product 
Inspection  ”  1245 0.099 0.282 14.1% 1245 0.003  0.054  0.5% 
  Notes: 
1.  Sample is at 6-digit NAICS.  
2.  US-Japan NTBs pooled across 1994-98.  US-EU NTBs for 1993. 
3.  NTB measured as coverage ratio. “%>0” column contains percentage of sample with positive NTB coverage. Table 2.1:  Estimates from Log-linear Model (5) and (6).   US-Japan NTBs, 1994-98 
 
  Dependent Variables 






















































Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1245 1245  1245  1245  1245  1245  1245 
k  6 6  6  6  6  6  6 
R




















Table 2.2:  Estimates from Log-linear Model (5) and (6).  US-EU NTBs, 1993. 
 
  Dependent Variables 
  Tariff Quota  Antidumping   Quotas & 
Prohibition 













































Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  295 295  295 295  295  295  295 
k  6 6  6 6  6  6  6 
R




2  −  −  −  5.24×10




3  −  −  −  −  −  − 
 
Notes:  
1. t-values in parenthesis.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 one-tailed levels, 
respectively.  
2. 4 dummies included: Food Processing, Resource-intensive industries, Capital-intensive industries, and General 
manufacturing. 
3. Sample of NAICS level industries. 
4. Implied a values calculated as 1/β (omitted if estimate of β is statistically insignificant or negative).Table 3.1:  Estimates from Linear Model (7) and (8) . US-Japan NTBs, 1994-98 
 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Tariff Quota  Antidumping   Quotas & 
Prohibition 

















































Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1245 1245  1245  1245  1245  1245  1245 
k  6 6  6 6  6 6  6 
R





















Table 3.2:  Estimates from Linear Model (7) and (8). US-EU NTBs, 1993 
 
  Dependent Variables 















































Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  295 295  295  295  295  295  295 
k  6 6  6 6  6  6  6 
R




2  −  −  −  3.79×10




3  −  −  −  −  −  − 
See Notes to Table 2. Table A1:  Statistics for dependent variable ln(τ
h/τ
f)  in model (5) and (6) 
  US-EU Data  US-Japan Data 
Variable N  mean  s.d  N  mean  s.d 
Tariff Quota 
  295 0.007  0.070  1245  0.012  0.082 
Antidumping 
Duties  295  −0.006 0.039  1245 0.005 0.043 
Quotas & 
Prohibition  295  0.001 0.016 1245 −0.012 0.095 
Licensing  & 
Authorization  295  0.001 0.109 1245 0.013 0.112 
Product 
Characteristic  295  0.070 0.197 1245 0.009 0.257 
Product Labeling 
  295  0.043 0.154 1245 0.019 0.108 
Product Inspection 
  295  0.032 0.139 1245 0.043 0.159 
 
Table A2:  Statistics for dependent variable τ
h/τ
f  in model (7) and (8) 
  US-EU Data  US-Japan Data 
  N mean  s.d  N mean  s.d 
Tariff Quota 
  295  1.010 0.100 1245 1.016 0.115 
Antidumping 
Duties  295  0.995 0.033 1245 1.006 0.054 
Quotas & 
Prohibition  295  1.001 0.018 1245 0.992 0.076 
Licensing  & 
Authorization  295  1.007 0.115 1245 1.021 0.144 
Product 
Characteristic  295  1.097 0.278 1245 1.045 0.302 
Product Labeling 
  295  1.058 0.215 1245 1.027 0.154 
Product Inspection 
  295  1.045 0.197 1245 1.060 0.224 
 
Table A3:  Statistics for regressors 
  US-EU Data  US-Japan Data 
  N mean  s.d  N mean  s.d 
Home factor  295  22.46  16.68  1245 31.71 25.70 
Foreign Factor  295  20.54  16.33  1245 22.03 20.26 
 
 